Differences in Cognitive-Perceptual Factors Arising From Variations in Self-Professed Paranormal Ability by Drinkwater, KG et al.
Drinkwater, KG and Dagnall, N and Denovan, A and Williams, C (2021)
Differences in Cognitive-Perceptual Factors Arising From Variations in Self-





Usage rights: Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0
Please cite the published version
https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk
BRIEF RESEARCH REPORT
published: 10 June 2021
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.681520
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 June 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 681520
Edited by:
Antonino Raffone,
Sapienza University of Rome, Italy
Reviewed by:
Alejandro Parra,
Instituto de Psicologia Paranormal,
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Malcolm Schofield,





This article was submitted to
Consciousness Research,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 16 March 2021
Accepted: 18 May 2021
Published: 10 June 2021
Citation:
Drinkwater KG, Dagnall N, Denovan A
and Williams C (2021) Differences in
Cognitive-Perceptual Factors Arising





Factors Arising From Variations in
Self-Professed Paranormal Ability
Kenneth Graham Drinkwater*, Neil Dagnall, Andrew Denovan and Christopher Williams
Department of Psychology, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, United Kingdom
This study examined whether scores on indices related to subclinical delusion formation
and thinking style varied as a function of level of self-professed paranormal ability. To
assess this, the researchers compared three groups differing in personal ascription
of paranormal powers: no ability, self-professed ability, and paranormal practitioners
(i.e., Mediums, Psychics, Spiritualists, and Fortune-Tellers). Paranormal practitioners
(compared with no and self-professed ability conditions) were expected to score
higher on paranormal belief, proneness to reality testing deficits, emotion-based
reasoning, and lower on belief in science. Comparable differences were predicted
between the self-professed and no ability conditions. A sample of 917 respondents
(329 males, 588 females) completed self-report measures online. Multivariate analysis
of variance (MANOVA) revealed an overall main effect. Further investigation, using
discriminant descriptive analysis, indicated that paranormal practitioners scored higher
on proneness to reality testing deficits, paranormal belief, and emotion-based reasoning.
Belief in science did not meaningfully contribute to the discriminant function. Overall,
results were consistent with previous academic work in the domains of paranormal
belief and experience, which has reported that paranormal-related cognitions and
perceptions are associated with factors related to subclinical delusion formation
(i.e., emotion-based/intuitive thinking).
Keywords: delusion formation, thinking style, paranormal ability and belief, reality testing, emotion-based
reasoning, belief in science
INTRODUCTION
Surveys report that belief in the paranormal endures within modern Western societies
(Ipsos MORI, 1998, 2003; Newport and Strausberg, 2001; Moore, 2005). They note also that
people frequently disclose paranormal experiences (Dagnall et al., 2016). This observation
aligns closely with the classic work of significant parapsychological researchers such as
Wilhelm Heinrich Carl Tenhaeff and Sybo Schouten (e.g., Tenhaeff, 1972; Schouten, 1994),
who observed that paranormal experiences were an important feature of existence meriting
empirical investigation. Despite interest in belief and experience, relatively few academic
studies have examined psychological factors associated with self-professed paranormal ability.
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Those that have, note that ascription of ability is linked
to certain cognitive-perceptual characteristics. For instance,
Krippner et al. (1998) examined the psychological profiles of
several participants who had undertaken consciousness training
delivered by Ramtha, a discarnate entity. Psychological tests
indicated that participant profiles were characterised by thin
boundaries and high levels of absorption (i.e., susceptibility
to immersive and self-altering experiences) and dissociation
(i.e., temporary inhibition of threatening perceptions/memories).
Typically, individuals with thin boundaries do not repress or
isolate uncomfortable material. These elements manifest as
creativity and the tendency to get lost in fantasy. Relatedly,
Parra and Carlos Argibay (2012) found that alleged psychics
(vs. controls) scored higher on dissociation, absorption, and
fantasy proneness.
Under reporting of self-professed supernatural powers is
counter-intuitive because prominent paranormal measurement
instruments have historically acknowledged the importance
of ability alongside belief and experience. For instance, the
Australian Sheep Goat Scale (Thalbourne and Delin, 1993),
which is one of the most used instruments to assess belief in
the paranormal, contains items indexing belief (e.g., “I believe
in the existence of ESP”), experience (e.g., “I believe I have
had personal experience of ESP”), and ability (e.g., I believe I
am psychic). Similarly, the Anomalous Experiences Inventory
(AEI) comprises subscales assessing Anomalous/Paranormal
Experiences, Beliefs, Fear, and Ability (Gallagher et al., 1994).
The inclusion of self-professed ability demonstrates that it
is often conceptualised as a significant facet of paranormality
(i.e., the state of being paranormal). Although, it is important
to note that while ability is related to belief and experience,
it also represents a discrete construct. This is illustrated by
consideration of zero-order correlations between AEI subscales,
which reveal a series of medium-large associations. Indeed,
Ability shares only 15% variance with Belief and 38% with
Experiences. Ability also relates differently to variables such
as neuroticism and general sensation seeking. In both cases,
Experiences and Beliefs correlate positively, whereas there is no
relationship with Ability (Gallagher et al., 1994).
Despite widescale belief in the paranormal and relatively
frequent reporting of concomitant experiences, there remains
only limited, highly contested empirical evidence to support the
existence of supernatural phenomena (Bressan, 2002; Dagnall
et al., 2007). Acknowledging this, from a rational, scientific
standpoint, critics, and sceptics contend that the designation of
paranormal ability arises from mundane conventional processes.
From a psychological perspective, a prevailing explanation for
self-professed psychic ability is faulty attribution. Specifically, the
misattribution of event outcome (s) to mysterious forces, powers,
and entities (Wiseman and Watt, 2006).
This explanation is consistent with Irwin et al. (2013), who
posit that personal validation of paranormality arises from two
distinct but connected stages. Stage one involves conscious
awareness of an inexplicable anomaly (unusual occurrence), in
the form of a stimulus or event for which there is no apparent,
rational explanation. Stage two requires the percipient to assign
paranormal causation to the occurrence (Lange et al., 2019).
Thus, the reification of paranormal ability results from personal
interpretation, and the desire to comprehend anomalous events
and incidences. Once established, the attributional framework
structures ensuing happenings and stimuli. This aligns with
the notion of worldview, which is a set of high order beliefs
that influence appraisal of existence and reality (Zusne and
Jones, 1982, 1989; Koltko-Rivera, 2004; Dagnall et al., 2015).
Accordingly, belief in paranormal ability facilitates the search for
outcomes and evidence that validate the supposition of “ability”
and negate inconsistent information. Consequently, paranormal
believers tend to demonstrate susceptibility to confirmation bias
(Drinkwater et al., 2012; Irwin et al., 2012b).
The notion that self-professed psychic ability in the general
population arises from active misinterpretation of causation,
is consistent with the notion that uncorroborated paranormal
inferences represent sub-clinical delusions (e.g., van Os, 2003;
Unterrassner et al., 2017). Hence self-professed psychic ability
in the absence of empirical support, is located on the same
continuum as full-blown psychosis, and accordingly manifests
similar features such as odd beliefs/behaviours and anomalous
perceptions (Unterrassner et al., 2017).
Furthermore, a defining feature of delusions is that they
are formed without due consideration of alternatives and lack
rigorous, rational scrutiny of the evidence from which they
derive (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fifth Edition, DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Corresponding with this definition a key characteristic of
delusional thinking is inadequate reality testing. Thus, delusions
are rigid beliefs that persist in the face of contradictory evidence
(Irwin et al., 2012a). Noting this, researchers have explained
belief in the paranormal in terms of reality testing failures (Irwin,
2003, 2004). These are best defined as deficiencies in the capacity
to differentiate self from non-self, intrapsychic from external
stimuli, and to maintain empathy with ordinary social criteria of
reality (Kernberg, 1996).
Irwin et al. (2012b) contend that another important feature
of delusions is that they are persistent beliefs endorsed on
their emotional (rather than) rational appeal. This concurs with
the clinically informed notion of delusions as beliefs arising
from faulty interpretation of anomalous experiences (Garety and
Freeman, 1999), and/or inadequate evidence (Coltheart et al.,
2010; Irwin et al., 2012b). The relationship between emotion-
based reasoning and belief in the paranormal is well-established
(Sappington, 1990; Irwin et al., 2012a).
Proneness to reality testing deficits and inclination to
emotion-based reasoning are also principal characteristics
of intuitive-experiential thinking (Denovan et al., 2017).
This thinking style features in various dual processing
models. Although these differ, they agree on the concept
that thinking/information processing is best conceptualised
as two fundamentally different modes. A prominent dual
processing model that researchers have applied to the study
of paranormal belief and experience is cognitive-experiential
self-theory (CEST; Epstein et al., 1996). Congruent with
subclinical delusions the experiential system is self-evidently
valid; based on associationistic connections; automatic, affective
oriented; mediated by experience; resistant to change; holistic;
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encodes reality in concrete images, metaphors, and narratives.
In contrast, the rational system is driven by external, objective
evidence; based on logical connections; intentional; reason
oriented; mediated by conscious appraisal of events; analytical;
and encodes reality in abstract symbols, words, and numbers.
Accordingly, these two systems are associated with different
preferential processing styles. Individuals high in experiential
thinking place an emphasis on intuitive (subjective based) data,
whereas greater levels of rational thinking manifest as a drive
for analytical (objective based) evidence. Consistent with the
dual processing framework, studies have robustly demonstrated
that intuitive processing is positively correlated with paranormal
belief (e.g., Irwin and Young, 2002; Aarnio and Lindeman, 2005;
Dagnall et al., 2017) and experience (Drinkwater et al., 2020).
Although some researchers report that increased critical thinking
reduces belief in the paranormal (Barberia et al., 2018; Wilson,
2018), others have found no effects (Irwin et al., 2013). Noting
this, instead of a measure of critical thinking, the present paper
included the Belief in Science Scale (Farias et al., 2013) as an index
of predilection for objective (vs. subjective) evidence.
THE PRESENT STUDY
Drawing on preceding research, this study investigated whether
scores on indices related to subclinical delusion formation and
thinking style varied as a function of level of self-professed
paranormal ability. To ensure that the full range of ability was
considered, paranormal practitioners (i.e., Mediums, Psychics,
Spiritualists, and Fortune-Tellers) were compared with those
declaring ability, and respondents with no stated supernatural
facilities. The focus on perceived ability and graded comparisons
between levels of self-professed ability (practitioners vs.
personally endorsed supernatural powers) signified a novel
and innovative approach. It was hypothesised that paranormal
practitioners would score higher on variables associated with
delusional and intuitive thinking (i.e., paranormal belief,
proneness to reality testing, and emotion-based reasoning) and
lower on an index of analytical-rational (i.e., belief in science)
than the ability group, who in turn should differ similarly to the
no ability condition.
Consideration of paranormal practitioners was important
because they are typically sincere in their beliefs. Particularly,
they represent a group of people who not only believe they
possess paranormal abilities, but also consider themselves able to
produce their psychic powers in a systematic, focused manner.
This active approach generally contrasts with people professing
ability, as they generally view their abilities as less defined
and more spontaneous. These factors suggest that psychic
practitioners will demonstrate higher levels of confidence in their
abilities than those who merely profess supernatural powers.
METHOD
Respondents
The sample consisted of 917 respondents (Mean age, M) =
33.25 years, SD = 14.75, range 18–83. There were 329 males
(36%), M = 37.34 years, SD = 15.55, range 18–82; and 588
females (64%), M = 30.97 years, SD = 13.78, range 18–83.
Respondent recruitment occurred through Bilendi, an online
data management platform. The only exclusion criterion was that
respondents must be at least 18 years of age.
Measures
Self-Professed Paranormal Abilities (Drinkwater et al.,
2020)
Respondents completed a series of items determining whether
they were paranormal practitioners (i.e., Medium, Psychic,
Spiritualist, and Fortune-Teller). Each category contained a
definition (i.e., Mediums, possess the ability to receive, and
relay information from deceased people to the living; Psychics,
perceive energy left behind from people who have died;
Spiritualists, provide information regarding the transition of
the human spirit from the physical body to the afterlife; or
Fortune-Tellers, have the ability to foretell future event). This was
followed by a “Yes/No” option, and an item asking respondents
to indicate the extent to which they believed they possessed
each ability (0–100 percent). In addition, respondents could also
indicate “Other” if their self-professed ability fell outside the
cited categories. Collectively, these items embody core receptive
elements of belief in the paranormal (Drinkwater et al., 2018).
Belief in the Paranormal
Belief in the paranormal was assessed using the Manchester
Metropolitan University New (MMU-N). Several previous
studies have used this scale (Dagnall et al., 2014; Drinkwater
et al., 2020). TheMMU-N contains 50-items related to (haunting,
superstition, religious belief, alien visitation, extrasensory
perception, psychokinesis, astrology, and witchcraft) (Dagnall
et al., 2010a,b; Dagnall et al., 2011). This measure was employed
in preference to the widely used Revised Paranormal Belief Scale
(Tobacyk, 2004) and Australian Sheep Goat Scale (Thalbourne
and Delin, 1993) because it samples greater intra dimension
phenomena and a wider range of construct content (Dagnall
et al., 2010a,b). Respondents responded via a seven-point Likert
scale (ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree).
The MMU-N has demonstrated excellent internal reliability
and validity (face and concurrent), indicating that it is both
conceptually coherent and psychometrically robust (Drinkwater,
2017). In this study, theMMU-N demonstrated excellent internal
reliability, α = 0.96.
Reality Testing
The reality testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality
Organization (IPO-RT; Lenzenweger et al., 2001) measures
the capacity to differentiate self from non-self, intrapsychic
from external stimuli, and maintain empathy with ordinary
social criteria of reality (Kernberg, 1996). Commensurate
with this delineation, the IPO-RT is an established scale
for assessing preference for intuitive-experiential processing
(subjective thinking) (Denovan et al., 2017), and proneness
to reality testing deficits (Irwin, 2004; Drinkwater et al.,
2012; Dagnall et al., 2017). The IPO-RT comprises 20-items
presented as statements (e.g., “When I’m nervous or confused,
it seems like the things in the outside world don’t make
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sense either”). Respondents indicated agreement via a five-
point Likert scale (1 = never true to 5 = always true). Higher
scores are indicative greater reliance on intrapsychic activity
(i.e., intuitive-experiential thinking) (Dagnall et al., 2018). The
IPO-RT possesses good internal and external reliability, and
construct validity (Lenzenweger et al., 2001; Drinkwater et al.,
2012; Dagnall et al., 2018). IPO-RT possessed excellent internal
reliability in the current study, α = 0.93.
Belief in Science
The Belief in Science Scale (BISS; Farias et al., 2013) evaluates
the degree to which science is valued as a source of superior
knowledge. The scale comprises ten statements (e.g., “The only
real kind of knowledge we can have is scientific knowledge”).
Respondents specify agreement using a six-point Likert scale (1=
Strongly Disagree to 6= Strongly Agree). Thus, total scale scores
range from 10 to 60; these are expressed as an average (1.0–6.0).
Higher scores indicate greater faith in the scientific approach.
The BISS performs well-psychometrically; possesses validity, and
high internal consistency (Farias et al., 2013; Dagnall et al., 2019).
High alpha reliability was evident in this study, α = 0.92.
Emotion-Based Reasoning
The degree to which decision-making is based upon affective
reactions was measured using the Emotion-Based Reasoning
(EBR) subscale of the Cognitive Biases Questionnaire (CBQ)
(Peters et al., 2014). The EBR comprises 6-items, framed within
brief vignettes. Respondents specify one of three options that best
epitomises their feelings. Options are recorded on a three-point
scale and include, 1 = absence of bias; 2 = presence of bias with
some qualification; and 3= presence of bias. Totalling EBR items
produced a score ranging from 6 to 18; high scores represent
greater affect-based decision-making. The CBQ has established
psychometric properties (e.g., internal reliability, r = 0.89; and
test-retest reliability, r = 0.92) (Peters et al., 2014). In the present
study, the EBR produced an acceptable alpha coefficient of α =
0.61 (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994; Ursachi et al., 2015).
Procedure
Potential respondents clicked a web-link to receive study
information. After providing informed consent, respondents
then progressed to the actual online survey. At this point,
instructions informed respondents to carefully read and
complete all questions, respond honestly, and work through
items at their own pace. The survey comprised sections
demographic characteristics (i.e., age and preferred gender), self-
professed paranormal abilities, and the measurement scales (i.e.,
MMU-N, BISS, IPO-RT, and EBR). Sections and measurement
scales rotated across respondents to prevent order effects. At the
end of the survey respondents received the debrief.
Data collection occurred at one point in time. A frequent
criticism of this cross-sectional approach is its proneness to
common method variance (CMV) (Spector, 2019). To prevent
CMV the study employed procedural remedies (Krishnaveni
and Deepa, 2013). Explicitly, section instructions created
psychological distance between scales by accentuating differences
between constructs and measures (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
Moreover, instructions reduced the potential for evaluation
apprehension and social desirability effects by telling respondents
that there were no right or wrong responses, and that they should
answer questions honestly.
Ethics Statement
The Manchester Metropolitan University Faculty of Health,
Psychology and Social Care Ethics Committee (October 2018)
provided ethical approval for a series of studies examining




Initial data examination used the professed ability (i.e., ability
vs. no ability) and practitioner group (i.e., Mediumship,
Psychics, Spiritualists, and Fortune-Telling) responses. This
provided comparisons in terms of frequencies and percentages
(see Table 1), and revealed that the number of paranormal
practitioners was consistent across specialities (i.e., Mediumship,
n= 17; Psychic, n= 19; Spiritualist, n= 22; and Fortune-Tellers,
n= 14).
Practitioners (vs. non-practising) demonstrated greater
confidence in their self-professed paranormal abilities. It was
not, however, possible to test this difference because practitioners
differed in the number of services they provided (practised in one
domain, n = 16, 46%; two domains, n = 6, 17%; three domains,
n = 8, 23%; and all four domains, n = 5, 14%). Moreover, it
was difficult to interpret this trend since it was unclear whether
practising resulted in higher confidence, or greater conviction
informed the motivation to practise.
Subsequently, to produce an overall condition for comparison
with non-practising and no ability conditions, it was necessary to
combine the practitioner groups. Collapsing practitioner groups
revealed, n = 35(4% of the total sample) were practising, n
= 373 (41%) non-practising, and n = 509 (56%) no self-
professed ability.
Descriptive information for paranormal belief, reality testing,
emotion-based reasoning, and belief in science scores as a
function of ability condition appears in Table 2. The practising
group scored highest on belief in the paranormal, proneness to
reality testing deficits and emotion-based reasoning, followed by
the non-practising and the no ability groups. The opposite trend
existed for belief in science.
Comparisons
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) tested whether
ability scores (no ability, ability, practicing) were significantly
different across measures. Prior to performing MANOVA, data
screening occurred. Consideration of skewness and kurtosis
indicated satisfactory results (i.e., all values fell within the range
of −2 to +2; Byrne, 2010). Data points signified outliers if
they had an absolute studentized residual >4 and a Cook’s
distance > 4 / (n–k−1), where n is the sample size and k is
the quantity of independent variables. No outliers existed using
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TABLE 1 | Frequencies (and percentages in brackets) of professed ability and practitioner groups.
Ability Ratings
Ability Status Practising Non-practising
Practitioner Group Yes No Practising Non-practising Total M SD M SD
Mediumship 285 (31.1) 632 (68.9) 17 (6.0) 268 (94.0) 285 60.59 33.81 35.52 26.21
Psychic 299 (32.6) 618 (64.7) 19 (6.4) 280 (93.6) 299 61.58 28.73 35.96 25.91
Spiritualist 255 (27.8) 662 (72.2) 22 (8.6) 233 (91.4) 255 59.55 34.15 35.92 25.73
Fortune-Teller 244 (26.6) 673 (73.4) 14 (5.7) 230 (94.3) 244 55.71 28.48 31.38 23.71
TABLE 2 | Means and standard deviations for paranormal belief, reality testing, emotion-based reasoning, and belief in science as a function of ability.
Variable
Paranormal belief Belief in science Reality testing Emotion-based reasoning
Ability N M SD M SD M SD M SD
Practising 35 226.14 43.02 36.05 11.32 61.34 18.50 10.0 2.12
Ability 373 200.65 43.38 36.88 10.12 48.64 13.52 9.09 2.25
No ability 509 151.63 52.08 40.80 11.84 36.26 10.91 7.53 1.73
these criteria. However, examining homogeneity of variance-
covariance matrices via Box’s test revealed a significant result
(144.34, p < 0.001), possibly due to unequal cell sizes. When
this occurs, Tabachnick et al. (2007) recommend using the more
robust Pillai’s criterion rather than Wilk’s lambda.
The results of the MANOVA revealed a significant main effect
of ability scores on paranormal belief, reality testing, emotion-
based reasoning, and belief in science, Pillai’s criterion = 0.33,
F(8, 1824) = 44.99, p < 0.001. A medium effect size existed, η
2
=
0.17. A post-hoc descriptive discriminant analysis examined how
ability conditions manifested across paranormal belief, reality
testing, emotion-based reasoning, and belief in science. One
significant discriminant function existed, λ= 0.67,χ2
(8)
= 361.69,
p < 0.001. This explained 98.4% of variance, canonical R2
= 0.57. According to the standardized canonical discriminant
functions and structure coefficients (Table 3), reality testing,
paranormal belief and emotion-based reasoning were important
in discriminating between levels of ability. Specifically, all
evidenced structure coefficients >0.32 (Tabachnick et al., 2007).
Reality testing contributed most to group separation (i.e., the
discriminant function), followed by paranormal belief, and
emotion-based reasoning. Centroid means indicated that the
practicing condition (1.59) exhibited greater levels of reality
testing, paranormal belief, and emotion-based reasoning than the
ability (0.66) and no ability (−0.59) conditions.
DISCUSSION
Analysis revealed differences between self-professed ability
groups on belief in the paranormal, proneness to reality
testing deficits, and emotion-based reasoning. Specifically,
paranormal practitioners possessed higher scores on these
variables compared with self-professed ability and no ability
TABLE 3 | Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients and structure
matrix of ability.
Variable Co-efficient rs
Reality testing 0.54 0.83
Paranormal belief 0.50 0.78
Emotion-based reasoning 0.25 0.61
Belief in science −0.05 −0.26
groups. The no ability group evidenced the lowest scores.
This pattern of results was consistent with the notion that
paranormal practitioners score higher on indirect indices of
delusion proneness and propensity to intuitive thinking (Irwin
et al., 2012a,b). These outcomes also generally aligned with study
hypotheses. Belief in science, however, did not meaningfully
contribute to differences in self-professed ability.
Overall, these results concurred with studies that have
identified a typical profile associated with paranormal-related
cognitions and perceptions (see Krippner et al., 1998; Parra
and Carlos Argibay, 2012). Within the current paper, this
comprised higher proneness to reality testing deficits and greater
reliance on emotion-based/intuitive thinking. These factors
are associated with delusion formation and maintenance in
subclinical populations (Irwin et al., 2012b).
The failure to observe the full range of group-based
differences across comparisons for belief in science, an index
of preference for objective (vs. subjective) based evidence,
aligned with prior work on critical thinking (see Wiseman and
Watt, 2006). Although some researchers report that increased
critical thinking reduces belief in the paranormal (Barberia
et al., 2018; Wilson, 2018), others have observed no effects
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(Irwin et al., 2013). Discrepancies may arise from the fact
that studies have used an array of measures. Additionally,
indirect self-report instruments, such as the Belief in Science
Scale, may not accurately index formal analytical reasoning.
This is because they rely on the validity of individual
responses and awareness of processes that are not fully available
to consciousness.
Furthermore, accuracy is difficult to establish as data is
collected at a separate point in time to performance, meaning
that judgments derive from memory. Additional problems are
that individuals interpret questionnaire items differently; base
their conclusions on readily accessed personal contexts, and
information triggered within the testing situation can influence
responses. These and other limitations explain why self-reported
metacognitive measures often poorly predict actual performance
(Jacobse and Harskamp, 2012).
Regardless, critical thinking is a difficult construct to assess
due to variations in definition and conceptualisation (i.e.,
evidence of multidimensionality) (Bensley and Murtagh, 2012).
Noting these concerns, alongside belief in science (i.e., preference
for objective data), future research should include direct,
measures of rational processing (see Pennycook et al., 2016).
This will indicate the degree to which belief in science is
associated with critical thinking and determine whether these
factors interact to reduce paranormal factors (belief, ability,
and experience).
Factors such as these may explain why preceding
academic work using the dual processing framework has
found stronger and more consistent effects for intuitive-
experiential thinking/processing (vs. analytical-rational). A
further factor to consider, which is rarely acknowledged
in prior work, is that these two systems work in parallel
(Epstein et al., 1996). Thus, differences may reflect the
tendency to engage in intuitive processing rather than a
deficit in critical thinking. This is an important notion since it
suggests that variations in thinking style are domain specific
rather than general. To test this supposition, subsequent
research could investigate whether self-professed paranormal
ability is associated with explicit cognitive errors such as
confirmation bias and misrepresentation of chance. Nonetheless,
findings overall suggest that intuitive thinking plays a more
important role in paranormal attributions than weaknesses in
analytical-rational processing.
The present paper found that within practitioner group
comparisons were conflated by the fact that individuals
frequently professed multiple abilities. This indicated that
future research should base contrasts on alternative distinctions.
In this context, qualitative work with Mediums, Psychics,
Spiritualists, and Fortune-Tellers advocates that they do not
find these categorisations useful or appropriate. Instead,
individuals prefer to qualify their abilities in terms of their
perceived phenomenology. These decisions are frequently
axiologically motivated, deriving from value judgments and
ethics, and influence practice. For instance, practitioners
frequently self-classify as “sensitive” or “intuitive.” Although
these terms lack precise operationalisation, they denote
different paranormal attributions. Sensitives are receptive
to psychic information, which they interpret, whereas
intuitives believe that they possess awareness of things that
have or could occur. Practitioners also make distinctions
between spontaneous and controlled abilities (external
vs. internal). Subsequent studies could better define these
terms and examine whether these perceived distinctions
manifest as profile variations. This seems possible, as
practitioners perceive paranormal phenomena in diverse
ways. Key examples being a strong reliance on either visual or
auditory stimuli.
This approach will enable the identification of important
dissimilarities in the psychological and psychopathological
profiles of paranormal practitioners. This will potentially
reveal whether high self-professed believers represent a
homogeneous group. Another research advance is to combine
self-professed ability with factors likely to reinforce convictions.
For example, confidence ratings of own psychic facilities,
length and breadth of practice, perceived success, client
numbers, etc. Identifying factors that predict self-professed
ability would enable the development of class profiles.
These, combining key attributes, would allow researchers
to determine whether practitioners differ in subtle, yet
important ways.
A potential criticism of the present study was that it focussed
on only a restrictive range of paranormal practises. These were
selected because they reflected psychic phenomena associated
with anomalous mental phenomena (psi) and communication
with the dead (psychic occurrence, mediumship, spiritualism,
telepathy, precognition, premonition, etc.), and represented
core tenets of parapsychology as defined by the Society for
Psychical Research (SPR). The SPR focuses on the nature
and causes of psi and survival research (i.e., whether aspects
of consciousness or personality survive bodily death). These
elements are correspondingly encapsulated within the Australian
Sheep Goat Scale, which is a frequently used measure of
paranormal belief (Drinkwater et al., 2018). In this context,
the practice areas were well-grounded, and sampled adequate
domain content.
Acknowledging the existence of practitioners in other
paranormal and scientifically unsubstantiated areas (i.e.,
pseudoscience and New Age Philosophy), follow-up studies
should investigate whether these individuals possess similar
psychological characteristics to those reported in this article.
Consideration of these areas is important because they
derive from different beliefs that may influence propensity to
subclinical delusion formation and thinking style. For example,
endorsement of pseudoscience derives from the incorrect
assumption that a phenomenon is supported by the scientific
method (Hines, 1988). Contrastingly, New Age Philosophy
originates from the notion that humans are entering into a time
of higher-level consciousness that will transform individuals
and society, and rejects science, realism, and objectivity (Sjöberg
and Wåhlberg, 2002). This line of work could also examine if
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training increases faith in ability and this expresses as heightened
delusion proneness.
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